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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
R. S. McKNIGHT,

Plaintiff,

~

vs.
STATE LAND BOARD,
\Case No. 9728
Defendant,

E'RVING WOLF,
Intervenor.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
STATEMEN'T OF ·THE KIND OF CASE
The instant action is upon 1a petition for certiorari from the Utah Supreme Court to review a
decision of the Utah State Land Board holding that
Erving Wolf was enti tied to lease certain state
lands pursuant to 'applications filed with the Land
Board.
THE PROCEE'DIN'GS BE LOW
The Utah State Land Board determined that
Erving Wolf was the properly qualified applicant
to lease certain state lands, by virtue of 'a high bid
upon simultaneous filings of lease applications under
1

1
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Section 65-1-4'5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, by
Erving Wolf and others. Thereafter, R. J. Hallberg
and Joseph Sherman, 'also simultaneous applicants,
filed a protest with the State Land Board and a
full hearing on the protest was held under the provisions of Section H5-1-9, Utah Code Annotated
19'53. The Land Board issued Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law supporting the award of le'ases
to Erving Wolf. The petitioner, R. S. McKnight
had, subsequent to the simultaneous filing date,
filed applications to lease covering most of the same
area as the applications of Erving Wolf. McKnight
con tended he should be declared the proper lessee
applicant. After the Land Board's decision, R. S.
McKnight, who appeared and participated in the
hearing before the Land Board, sought review of
the board's decision by writ of certiorari to this
court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The State Land Board seeks !affirmance of its
decision determining that Erving Wolf is a proper
lessee of the lands covered by mineral lease application numbers 19120, 19'140 and 19141.
ST~TEMEN'T

OF FA:CTS
'The Land Board adopts the statement of facts
'appearing in the brief of petitioner, R. S. McKnight,
as being essentially correct.
2
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE STATE LAND BOARD COULD ALLOW
ERVING WOLF TO AMEND THE APPLICATIONS
FILED ON HIS BEHAUF BY VIRTUE OF RULE 6
OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE UTAH
STATE LAND BOARD.

The applications filed in the instant case by
Erving Wolf were mineral lease applications for
the purpose of recovering oil and gas (Ex. 1-A) .
Under the provisions of Section 65-1-97, U.C.A.
1953, the State Land Board is empowered to adopt
rules and regulations relating to the leasing of state
lands for the purpose of recovering oil -and gas.
The section provides :
1

"The state land board may make and
enforce rules and regulations not inconsistent
with the provisions of this act for carrying
the same into effect." (Emphasis added.)
Additionally, Section 6'5-1-6, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
"The board may make all needful rules
and regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of this title for carrying the same into
effect."
Thus, the general power of the latter statute
matches the specific power of the section relating
to oil and gas leases and allows the Land Board
to make rules and regulations in aid of carrying
out the powers otherwise vested in the 'board by
the Legislature. Acting in pursuit of the authority
3
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contained in the above sections, the Utah State Land
Board promulgated rules for the leasing of mineral interests of the state. Rule 6 of these rules provides in its pertinent part:

"* * * If an applicant is determined to he
deficient, it shall be returned to the applicant with instructions for its amendment or
completion. If the application is resubmitted
in satisf1actory form within the time specified in the instructions, it shall retain its
original filing time. If the application is resubmitted at any later time, it shall be deemed
filed at the time of resubmission."
The provisions of Rule 6 allow the Land Board
to accept an tamendment to a deficient application
without loss of priority in time. In the instant case,
the application of Erving Wolf was found to be
deficient in the following particulars (R. Finding
of Fact, p. 3):
"11. Each of the three applications filed
by Erving Wolf, namely application numbers
1'9T20, '19140 and 19141 were each deficient
in the following particulars:
a. ·They were not on current forms provided by the State Land Board.
b. They did not include an offer to accept all of the requirements of the
provisions of Title 6'5, Chapter 1, Utah
Code Annotated, 19'53, as amended,
governing the issuances of oil and gas
leases 'and operations thereunder.
c. 'They were not accompanied with a
1

4
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statement under oath, over the applicant's signature, of his qualifications
as 'an Applicant for Oil and Gas Le'ases
as defined in Section 6'5-1-88 and as
required by Section 65-1-88, U.C.A.,
1953, as amended."
The Land Board determined that Rule '6 allowed
the correction of these deficiencies ( R. 'Concl. of L.,
p. 8). Petitioner has indicated in his brief, page
26, that the Attorney General advised the board
that corrective action would be improper. Actually,
the Attorney General merely submitted a brief in
argument on the facts and contended therein that
Rule 6 should be interpreted as allowing deficiencies
in applications to be corrected only where they were
defective on their :Dace. Since the deficiencies in the
applications of Erving Wolf were not of such a
nature, the Attorney General contended Rule 6 did
not apply and that under general principles of public land law, all the simultaneous applications should
be rejected. The Land Board, however, interpreted
Rule 6 as allowing the correction of deficiencies
in applications where the deficiency was not apparent on its face. Therefore, the petitioner's theory
of the case is not actually the issue before the court.
Courts usually will not override an administrative
'agency's interpretation of its own rules unless the
interpretation is obviously arbitrary or erroneous.
Bowles v. Mannie & Co., 155 F. 2d 12'9 (C.C.A.,
Ill.). ·The Land Board's interpretation of its own
5
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rule has the effect, in the absence of unreasonableness, of becoming part of the regulation. Foley v.
Benedict, 12'2 Tex. 19'3, 5'5 S.W. '2d 805; 42 Am.
Jur., Public Administrative Law, Sec. 77. The interpretation of Rule 6 by the Land Board is not
clearly arbitrary, and the language of the rule makes
no distinction between deficiencies on the face of
applications and those not readily ·apparent from
the application itself. Since the language of the rule
is reasonably susceptible to the interpretation placed
on it by the Land Board, it cannot be said that the
Land Board's interpretation was arbitrary. Therefore, that interpretation must be accepted by the
court. Equipment Distributors v. Porter, 1'56 F;2d
296.
1

Rule 6, therefore, allows the correction of deficiencies in oil and gas lease applications without
loss of priority of time. Therefore, the Land Board's
actions, in allowing the amendment by Erving Wolf
so as to correct deficiencies in the original applications, were in accordance with their own rules,
which have the force of law when properly promulgated. Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 31'6 U.S. 481
1942) ; United States .ex r.el Accardi v. Shauphnessy, 34 7 U.S. '260 ( 1953).
1

(

POINT II.
RULE 6 OF THE STATE LAND 'BOARD'S RULES
FOR THE LEASING OF MINERAL INTERESTS ON
6
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STATE LANDS IS A VALIDLY PROM ULGATED RULE
AND IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH STATUTORY
LAW.
1

Sections 65-1-6 and 65-1-97, U.C.A. 19'53, allow
the Land Board to promulgate rules to carry out
its duties which under 65-1-14, U.C.A. 1'9'53, include the "direction, m'anagement and control" of
unappropriated state lands. This court has previously indicated that the Land Board has wide discretion in the handling and disposition of state
lands, and that courts will not interfere in the exercise of that discretion unless the hoard acts in excess of its powers or jurisdiction. 'Thus, in Whitmore
v. Candland, 47 Utah 7'7, 151 P. 528 (1915), this
court stated:

"* * * The whole m:atter of making disposi-

tion of the state's land was placed in the
hands and under the control of the State Land
Board. No right of appeal to the courts, or
of reviewing the board's actions otherwise
by the courts, except where lack or excess of
power is alleged, has been given. All the
courts can do, therefore, is to inquire in to and
determine in a proper proceeding whether
the board has acted without or in excess of
its powers or jurisdiction. Courts may notreview the acts or conduct of the hoard, for the
purpose of correcting mere irregularities."
See also Miles v. Wells, 22 Utah 55, 61 P. 534
(1900); Safarik v. Udall, 304 F. '2d 944 (1962);
Zarraga v. Texas Co., 284 F. '2d 657 (19 60). These
cases are in keeping with the legislative mandate in
1

1

1

1

7
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Sections 6'5-1-6 and 6'5-1-9'7, U.C.A. 1'95'3, that rules
are only prohibited where they are "inconsistent
with the provisions" of statutory law. 'Thus, the only
issue is whether Rule 6 is consistent or inconsistent with statutory mandates. If the rule is consistent with the Legislature's directive, then the
petitioner's writ should be V1acated; if not, the writ
should be made permanent, directing the Land ;Board
to reject the previous applications of Erving Wolf
and date the recent applications as of the actual
date of filing. Olsen v. State Tax Comm., 12 U.2d
4:2, 361 P. 2d 1112 (19'61) ; Kettner v. Snow, NJl.
96'59, Utah (October 5, 1962).
The cases ·cited in petitioner McKnight's brief
do not concern fact situations where the administrative agency, Secretary of Interior, or Bureau of
Land Management, had promulgated a rule allowing
for deficiency amendment without loss of priority
'and, therefore, are not relevant to this case. 1 The
only real issue of concern is whether Rule 6 is valid,
or whether it is inconsistent with statutory interdiction. Carlson v. Real Estate Comm., 38 H'awaii
9; Davis, Administration Law Tr,eatise, Sec. 5.03.
The general rule of construction of statutes and
regulations is stated in 42 Am. J ur., Public Administativ.e Law, Sec. 101:
1

Even were the federal cases material to the issue presented in the
instant case, the decision of McKenna v. Seaton, 259 F.2d 780
(1958), allowed the amendment of a federal oil and gas application without loss of priority.

8
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"Rules made in the exercise of a power
delegated by statute should be construed together with the statute to make, if possible,
an effectual piece of legislation in harmony
with common sense and sound reason. The
same rules of construction which apply to statutes govern the construction and interpretation of administrative rules and regulations.
If it can fairly be done, the rule should be
so construed and applied as to make it conform to the powers conferred upon the administrative body, rather than as being an
assumption of power not conferred."
It is submitted that Rule 6 is not inconsistent
with Section 65-1-88, U.C.A. '195·3. This section provides:
"* * * Applications must be accompanied by
payment of the filing fee and rental for the
first year together with a statement under
oath over applicant's signature of his qualifications as required by this act."
Rule 6 in no way is contrary to this sta:tute,
nor does the statute prohibit the Land Board from
allowing applications not meeting the requirements
of Section 6'5-1-88, U.C.A. 1953, to be corrected
without loss of priority. Rule ·6 only !allows the correction of deficiencies in the applications; it does
not allow the applicant to correct deficiencies in his
own status if at the time of filing the application
he is not properly qualified. Therefore, 6'5-1-87,
U.C.A. 1953, relating to qualifications of applicants,
is not inconsistent with Rule 6. In the instant case,
no claim was made that Erving Wolf was not a
9
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properly qualified applicant at the time of filing
the application, but only that the application was
deficient. Therefore, keeping with the rule that statutes and administrative regulations should be construed in harmony, Rule 6 should be determined
not to be inconsistent with statutory directives.
Further, many good and sufficient reasons
exist that indicate that the Legislature did not intend Sections 65-1-87 and '88, U. C.A. 1953, to preclude the Land Board from allowing applications
to be corrected. First, Section 65-1-87, U.C.A. 1953,
merely sets out the qualifications for an applicant;
if an applicant meets these qualifications it would
seem absurd to allow a matter of form to preclude
the board from issuing a lease that might otherwise
be more beneficial to the State. This court recognized the merit to such a position in Huber v. Deep
Creek Irr. Co., 6 U. 2d 1 5, 305 'P. 2d 478 (1956),
where the court said with reference to an attack
on a water right because of the failure to notarize
an appropriation !application:
1

1

"* * * ·To deny one rights to such water because, at the possible expense of perjury, one
did not notarize a final proof form until completion of all requests and corrections were
made, some details of which one reasonably
might believe would bear correction, - as
here, - also would seem absurd."
Section 6'5-1-88, U.C.A. 1953, relating to the
form of oil and gas applications, has as its purpose
10
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to make certain that the applicant is qualified. However, if the board finds that the applicant is qualified, but that the application is not in proper form,
they would certainly be justified allowing correction of the application. Not to so allow could be more
injurious to the State than otherwise. The instant
case graphically demonstrates this problem. Section 65-1-J. U.C.A. 19'53, provides for simultaneous filing in certain instances. The instant case
involved a situation proper for simultaneous ~ling.
In cases of simultaneous filing, Section 65-1-46' (b),
U.C.A. t9'53, provides that the Land Board shall
issue leases to the highest bidded. The bids in the
instant case were as follows:
Erving Wolf
No. 19120 No. 19140 No. 19141
$2.59/acre $2.59/acre $2.59/acre
Joseph Sherman
R. J. Hallberg
$'2.01/acre $'2.34/acre $2.34/acre
Paul 8. Callister
R. S. McKnight
$1.00/acre $1.00/acre $1.00/acre
Thus, if it were to be held that R. S. McKnight's
position is correct, the State would stand to lose
$1.59 per annum on the encompassed lands. The
applications include approximately 2100 acres which
would mean the State would lose about $3,-300.00
annually.
1

11
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For these reasons, it is submitted that the Land
Board was fully justified in promulgating Rule 6
to allow for corrected applications without loss of
priority and, further, that no clear inconsistency
between the rule and statutory l'aw exists. Therefore, the board's decision should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
It is generally conceded that governmental
agencies, charged with administrative responsibility,
must have reasonable l:a:titude in carrying out functions and duties of their administrative office. The
State Land Board has attempted, by promulgating
Rule 6, to provide a proper and reasonable means
to assist in the leasing of state lands. There is nothing explicitly prohibitive of such regulation in statutory law, or nothing inconsistent with the reasonable interpretations of Title 65, dealing with oil
and gas leasing on state lands.
It is, therefore, submitted that the Land Board's
action should be affirmed and the writ of certiorari
vacated.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRA'T'T KE'SLER
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant
12
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